The participation rate for working-age adults in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program increased by 37 percent from 1987 to 1993. This paper examines the role of public health insurance provided through Medicaid on the SSI participation decision. I use the rapid growth in Medicaid expenditure across states and over time as a proxy for its value. The estimation is complicated by the easing of standards for determining disability. If the marginal individual who entered SSI under these easier standards was healthier than the average participant, then average Medicaid expenditure would fall. Thus, conventional OLS estimates could lead to a spurious negative correlation between average Medicaid expenditure and SSI participation. I therefore apply two-stage least squares (TSLS) to estimate Medicaid's effect, using Medicaid expenditure for blind and elderly SSI recipients, and adult and child AFDC recipients as instruments for disabled Medicaid expenditure.
INTRODUCTION
From 1984 to 1993, the disabled Supplemental Security Income (SSI) population grew at an annual average rate of 9.2 percent. This study asks whether the availability of public health insurance 1 through the Medicaid program contributed to the caseload growth. I focus on the SSI participation behavior of adults between the ages of 18 and 64 using Current Population Survey (CPS) data spanning the calendar years 1987 to 1993.
Although every state offers Medicaid to disabled SSI recipients in some form, the value of the insurance varies. Each state has considerable leeway in the scope of health care services and access to care from Medicaid. Following the recent empirical approaches of Blank (1989) and Winkler (1991) , who estimate the effect of Medicaid on female-headed households, I proxy for Medicaid's value with the average Medicaid expenditure for disabled SSI recipients in each state and year. If increased Medicaid expenditure reflects a greater valuation, then this proxy should result in increased SSI participation.
An important endogeneity problem emerges in using average Medicaid expenditure of disabled recipients to predict SSI participation. Beyond changes in medical prices, scope of services, and access to care, variation in expenditures may reflect changes in the underlying health status for disabled SSI recipients. Since the criteria in evaluating disability are somewhat subjective, the standards may change. If the standards become less strict, then relatively healthy people will enter the SSI rolls, thereby lowering the average expenditure. Thus, the SSI rolls may increase at the same time that 2 2 average Medicaid expenditure falls, yielding a spurious negative correlation that is driven by changes in health status. To correct this bias, I therefore apply two-stage least squares (TSLS) with four instruments: the average Medicaid expenditure for SSI blind and elderly, and the average Medicaid expenditure for AFDC children and adults. The instruments reflect variation in the generosity of the state's Medicaid package (access to and quality of care, medical prices, and scope of services), and they are not correlated with changing definitions of disability. Since these four groups are well-defined and the criteria for Medicaid eligibility are much more objective, average Medicaid expenditure reflects the true variation in Medicaid's value.
The results support the preceding story. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates yield small and imprecise estimates of Medicaid expenditure on SSI participation. In contrast, the TSLS estimates yield results that are more than four times as large. Not only are the instruments extremely powerful in explaining average Medicaid expenditure for the disabled in the first stage, but most of the models presented also pass overidentification tests. I conclude that the rising value of Medicaid contributed greatly to the increase in the SSI rolls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Medicaid explains as much as one-third of the SSI growth. Moreover, the effects are concentrated in the white population and not the African-American population.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some background on SSI and Medicaid, and reviews the economic importance of Medicaid for other populations. This section also discusses the practical problems that previous research has encountered in isolating Medicaid's effect. Section 3 presents some theoretical considerations. The institutional detail is incorporated into a budget constraint, and implications for SSI participation are discussed. Section 4 presents a descriptive analysis of the CPS data. This section documents the very different trends in SSI and Medicaid participation by race and gender for working-age adults. Section 5 presents results from OLS and TSLS. I provide tests 3 U.S. House of Representatives (1993) .
3 Ross (1995) . 4 Required coverage includes inpatient and outpatient hospital services, rural health clinic services, 5 federally qualified health center services, laboratory and X-ray services, nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, family planning services, physicians' services, home health services for any individual entitled to nursing facility care, nurse-midwife services, and services of certified nurse practitioners.
on the validity of the instruments, and perform some sensibility checks. Section 6 concludes and presents further extensions.
BACKGROUND
Background on the SSI-Disabled and Medicaid Programs SSI was introduced in 1974, replacing state-run programs for the needy aged, blind, and disabled. In 1993 alone, $23.5 billion was spent on SSI cash benefits for these groups. While the number of elderly and blind participants remained stable, the number of disabled SSI participants increased from 2.9 million in 1988 to 4.0 million in 1993.
A poor adult must be disabled to qualify for SSI. This figure is in nominal dollars. The expenditure numbers on the disabled throughout will include 6 Medicaid spending in intermediate-care facilities and skilled nursing homes. It is important to include this component because access to these facilities is, indeed, a part of Medicaid's value. While only a small portion of the population will become institutionalized, it is also true that only a small portion will use any particular Medicaid service.
U.S. House of Representatives (1993) .
7
Medicaid beneficiaries who are disabled account for a far greater share of Medicaid's costs than nondisabled recipients. The average spending on blind and disabled beneficiaries amounted to $9,226 per beneficiary in 1993. 6 Disabled adults are excluded from most public health insurance except through SSI. A notable exception to this is section 1619 of the SSI law, which is intended to remove some of the work disincentives for the disabled. Section 1619(a) provides continuation of cash benefits even if earnings exceed the "substantial gainful activity" level, as long as the disabling condition has not improved.
Under section 1619(b), disabled individuals can continue to be eligible for Medicaid even if their earnings take them past the SSI income limit. These provisions turn out to be quite minor, however. In September 1992, just 48,000 of the 2.6 million disabled adults between the ages of 18 and 64 participated in either the 1619(a) or 1619(b) program. For these provisions to be applicable, an 7 individual must still initially qualify for and participate in SSI. So the provisions are not really an avenue off SSI.
Prior Studies of Medicaid and Welfare Participation
Although Medicaid was introduced thirty years ago and program costs have been soaring, only recently has it garnered much academic interest. One reason Medicaid's effect on SSI participation has been ignored is because the behavioral elasticities of the blind, elderly, and disabled were believed to be extremely small. In addition, estimating Medicaid's impact on welfare participation is complicated by the high correlation between eligibility for Medicaid and cash benefits for the disabled.
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Winkler (1991) examines both AFDC participation and labor supply using the 1986 CPS. In her 8 model, she cashes out Medicaid at the market value for each state, in a fashion similar to Blank (1989) . She finds that Medicaid generally has a modest, but statistically significant, impact on labor force participation, but no effect on hours of work or AFDC participation.
Though there are few existing examinations of Medicaid and SSI, several studies have looked at the impact of Medicaid on AFDC participation and work effort. The earlier studies found that Medicaid had a surprisingly small effect on the welfare and work choices for female heads, but more recent work has found larger effects.
Blank (1989) (Yelowitz 1995a) . These expansions linked Medicaid eligibility to the federal poverty line rather 6 than to a state's AFDC income eligibility limit, thus offering an incentive to leave welfare. I found that these reforms significantly decreased AFDC participation and increased labor force participation.
Among female-headed households, the effects were largest for previously married women, but were negligible for never-married women.
Very little evidence exists on the interaction of Medicaid and SSI. I examined recent changes in the Medicaid program on the SSI participation for a different group, senior citizens (Yelowitz 1995b) .
By using the implementation of a buy-in program for Medicare in the 1980s (which offered a substitute for the cost-sharing provisions of Medicaid), I found significant interactions: Medicaid has a bigger impact on exits from SSI for the elderly than it has on exits from AFDC for female heads.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section briefly outlines several ways that Medicaid's value influences SSI participation.
The individual maximizes a utility function, U(C,L), which is a function of consumption goods (C) and leisure (L). The price of consumption goods (P ) is normalized to $1 per unit, while the price of leisure C is simply the wage rate (W). He is given a time endowment (T), which he can allocate between work and leisure. He may also receive nonlabor income (N), for instance from the earnings of his spouse.
Therefore, his full budget constraint is initially defined as:
(1) P C + WL = WT + N.
C
In Figure 1 , this is represented as the segment ABC. Given this budget constraint, the consumer maximizes his utility.
By introducing the SSI system into the model, the government changes the budget constraint.
The program offers a grant (G), which was $669 per month for a married couple in 1994, and This model could also be amended to include the stigma of program participation by adding an argument to the utility function, U=U(C,L,P), where the act of SSI participation (P) lowers utility. As Moffitt (1983) three different effects on the budget constraint. It lowers the wage that the individual can receive in the labor market either by limiting the type of job and hours of work he can take, or by lowering his productivity. Poor health also changes preferences toward work and leisure: at any bundle, the marginal rate of substitution rises with poor health. Finally, poor health increases the value of Medicaid-since expected utilization is higher, the benefits are worth more than before. Unless accurate proxies for the individual's health status can be found, models relying on variation in Medicaid's value generated by health status may mistakenly attribute changes in preferences, productivity, and wages to Medicaid.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
I use the 1988-94 CPS March Annual Demographic File, which provides retrospective information on family income, health insurance coverage, and program participation from 1987 to 1993
for the noninstitutionalized population. Because only a small fraction of the adult population participates in SSI-disabled, a large data set is essential to observe trends. Therefore, the CPS is perhaps a more useful household data set than others. I begin the analysis with the 1988 CPS because several additional questions on health insurance coverage were added, making later surveys less
10
These questions specifically dealt with the health insurance status of children in the household.
Survey respondents were effectively asked twice about the health insurance coverage of children.
See Currie and Gruber (1994) for an analysis of these Medicaid pregnancy expansions. Winkler (1991) in excluding Arizona from the analysis. Arizona had a Medicaid demonstration project for part of the period I examine, and data on average Medicaid expenditures is not available for all years. unchanged. This is expected since the federal benefit level is indexed for inflation. Medicaid expenditure for the disabled increased more than $2,700 in real terms. This rise in Medicaid expenditure looks similar to the rise in overall SSI participation rates; thus, this is at least suggestive that a link between Medicaid expenditure and SSI may exist. 
REGRESSION RESULTS

OLS Estimates Using Average Medicaid Expenditure of Disabled
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While employment outcomes may be determined simultaneously with SSI participation, I include 16 these variables to make comparisons with Stapleton, Coleman, and Dietrich (1995) . The effects of Medicaid, both in the OLS and TSLS models, get much stronger by excluding these variables.
I include many of the same demographic variables that Winkler (1991) includes in her model on 17 female heads. I have modified all specifications by replacing the respondent's age and its square with a full set of dummy variables for ages 18 to 64. In addition, I have restricted the sample to adults aged 22 to 64 since some rules that govern the SSI eligibility for a child who reaches the ages of 18 to 21 have changed. The results are similar to those reported here.
In all the models presented, the joint significance of the time dummies and state dummies is 18 overwhelming.
in the state and the number participating in the labor force. The vector X contains several individual-16 i level variables that may also influence SSI participation, including the respondent's age and its square, race, residence in a central city, education, marital status, number of children present, gender, and veteran status. In addition, I amend this basic specification to allow for nationally uniform, time-17 varying shocks to SSI participation through the inclusion of five time dummies, as well as timeinvariant, state-specific shocks to SSI participation through the inclusion of forty-nine state dummies.
18
The coefficients , , , , , , and are to be estimated, and is an error term. Time dummies also control for two other sources of SSI growth. First, SSI spell lengths may have increased in duration because the Social Security Administration was performing fewer disability reviews. Rupp and Scott (1995) find that persons who were first awarded SSI disability benefits in 1993 are expected to stay on the rolls for almost 18 years. This is an increase from 11 years for those who 20 Ross (1995) .
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The programs may have changed over time, however. Several states eliminated their GA program 20 in the early 1990s. If GA cuts are correlated with Medicaid expenditure, then even the model that includes state-and time-fixed effects will be biased. In other specifications, I have also included a state-specific time trend in equation (2) The result in the first column of Table 5 shows that the OLS estimate of is statistically 1 insignificant and economically modest. The point estimate implies that increasing Medicaid by $1,000
leads to an increase in SSI participation of 0.009 percentage points. Since Table 4 illustrates that average Medicaid expenditure for the entire sample rose in real terms from $6,700 in 1987 to $9,491 in 1993, this coefficient estimate implies that increased Medicaid expenditure raised the probability of costs can explain around 7 percent of the rise in SSI participation.
Increasing the SSI cash benefit increases SSI participation, but the coefficient is insignificant.
Raising the benefit by $1,000 results in an increase in SSI participation of 0.032 percentage points.
Although the coefficient suggests SSI cash benefits may explain the rise in participation, Table 4 shows little change in cash benefits over time. The CPS estimates indicate that, over the period, SSI benefits increased very slightly in real terms from $7,211 to $7,218. Even though cash benefits increase the probability of participation, they cannot explain the growth. The table also shows the effect of a third policy variable: residence in a Section 209(b) state-one that requires a second, separate application for Medicaid. Since very few states changed status, the effect of 209(b) status is essentially subsumed in the state fixed effect. The estimate in this column is not significantly different from zero.
The business cycle variables enter in the appropriate direction. In the OLS specification, increases in the unemployment rate raise SSI participation, but the significance is somewhat fragile in the other specifications. Increases in labor force participation have a more robust, negative effect on SSI participation.
Education and family structure play important roles in SSI participation. Relative to those with a college degree, individuals with less than nine years of education are 6.2 percentage points more likely to participate in SSI, while those with less than twelve years are 2.0 percentage points more likely to participate. In addition, those who only completed high school are significantly more likely to participate in the SSI-disabled program than those who entered college, but the economic impact is not as dramatic as for the other educational groups. Being married lowers SSI participation by 3 percentage points, while the presence of another young child increases the probability of participation.
The Supreme Court ruled that disability standards for children may not be narrower than those 21 applied to adults. As a result, eligibility criteria for children are based on a child's developmental delay and limitations on the child's ability to engage in age-appropriate activities of daily living. This has increased the number of children classified as disabled. Prior to 1990, the same disability criteria that applied to adults were also applied to children.
The signs of the other demographic and location-specific characteristics enter into SSI participation largely as expected. SSI participation increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. The point estimates indicate that SSI participation increases all the way up until age 64. Since many physical disabilities may not occur until later ages, this finding is plausible. Relative to whites, being
African American raises the probability of SSI participation by 1.61 percentage points. This is consistent with the continually higher levels of participation in Table 3 . Living in a central city raises SSI participation. This may occur for two reasons. First, those in central cities may have more access to welfare and Social Security offices or health care facilities, which lowers the transaction costs of SSI participation and raises the value of Medicaid, respectively. Second, if living in a central city means that the individual has better information about the programs, he would be more likely to participate.
Finally, being male or being a veteran significantly lowers SSI participation.
Instrumental Variables Estimates Using Average Medicaid Expenditure of Other Medicaid Groups as Instruments
The prior estimates used variation in disabled Medicaid expenditure. These may be biased if changes in the underlying health of the SSI population affected both Medicaid's value and SSI participation. If the eligibility criteria for disability become less strict, for example, so that people who were previously found to be ineligible are now deemed eligible for SSI, then the former estimates of 1 would be too small. In the Supreme Court's Sullivan v. Zebley decision, such a reevaluation occurred for children, and this may have had spillovers into the adult population. In addition, if states attempted 21 to shift their General Assistance and Medically Needy beneficiaries onto the SSI rolls, and if these groups happened to be healthier, the OLS results would be biased. In this case, the marginal disabled SSI recipient will likely incur less health care expenditure than the average recipient, so that average expenditure falls while SSI participation increases. This would lead to a spurious negative correlation (which in turn biases the coefficient downward).
To correct for this simultaneity bias, I instrument for average Medicaid expenditure of the disabled in each state-year cell with the corresponding average expenditure of the elderly and blind SSI recipients, and adult and child AFDC recipients. These variables reflect different aspects of the state's Medicaid program that influence its value, such as variation in health care prices, access to care, and scope of services. Since the criteria to qualify for these other groups are more objective, then these instruments are unlikely to be correlated with changing definitions of disability.
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Appendix Table 1 Table 5 increases dramatically, consistent with changing the budget constraint in Figure 1 . Increasing Medicaid expenditure by $1,000 is now associated with an increase in the probability of SSI participation by 0.039 percentage points. Again, taking the rise in Medicaid expenditure from Table 4 , this estimate implies that rising health care costs from 1987 to 1993 raised the probability of participation by 0.108 percentage points. Since the total increase in SSI participation was 0.370
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The finding of weak effects on policy variables for African Americans is quite common. For two 24 recent examples, see Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) and Bronars and Grogger (1996) .
percentage points, then rising health care costs can explain nearly one-third of the rise in SSI participation. The point estimates on the other explanatory variables are similar to the OLS specification. By comparing the coefficient estimates on Medicaid expenditure and SSI benefit levels, a $1,000 increase in Medicaid's value leads to a similar rise in participation as a $1,178 increase in cash.
Recall that Table 3 showed dramatic differences in SSI participation rates across racial lines.
This suggests that rising health care costs have different effects on the African-American and white populations. The two columns in Table 6 divide the sample into whites and African Americans, respectively. I use the same instruments as in Table 5 .
The Medicaid coefficient estimates for the white population are roughly similar to the TSLS estimates from the second column of Table 5 . The effect of Medicaid expenditure falls slightly, and the coefficient is more precisely estimated than in the full sample. Cash benefits appear to play a less important role for whites in SSI participation than for the pooled sample. In contrast, Medicaid appears to play little role in the SSI participation decision of African Americans, though the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Although the policy variables explain little of the SSI participation decision for African Americans, the demographic variables on education, family structure, gender, and veteran status are all significant predictors of participation.
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Even though the proposed instruments are powerful in predicting Medicaid expenditure for the disabled, to be valid they must also be uncorrelated with the error term. In practical terms, this means that the health status of the other SSI and AFDC groups remains unchanged. Since the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables, it is possible to test the overidentifying restrictions on the excluded instruments. Table 7 shows this. I regress the predicted residuals from the simply capturing some omitted factor, we might expect to see similar effects across these groups. Table 8 shows the TSLS results for these groups. The results are consistent with a "true" effect of Medicaid. The coefficient on Medicaid expenditure is extremely strong in column (1) for those lacking private coverage, while it is not significant for those with private coverage.
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This paper finds that rising health insurance costs are an important reason for participation in the SSI-disabled program. By using a large, nationally representative household data set, I find that as Are the estimated effects too large? At this point, it is important to consider recent findings on other Medicaid populations. In other work, I found significant effects on AFDC participation for female heads and on SSI participation for elderly households (Yelowitz 1995a (Yelowitz , 1995b . In those studies, the policy experiment was somewhat different from in this study, however. The policy changes for young children and the elderly who are offered Medicaid without the need to apply for AFDC or SSI. In an approach more similar to the current study, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) value Medicaid and find strong effects on AFDC participation for female heads. It is plausible that health insurance plays a more important role in the economic decision-making of disabled adults than either female heads or elderly households, so the strong effects appear reasonable.
The findings have several policy implications for program design. If Medicaid is an important determinant of SSI participation, then offering health insurance without the need to participate in SSI may reduce total costs. This could occur because disabled adults may then forego the cash benefits from SSI. On the other hand, some disabled adults who were not previously participating in SSI because of the stigma they associate with the program may decide to participate in a Medicaid-only program, which could increase costs. To some extent, this might occur through the Medically Needy program, which many states offer. Since the MN program typically has lower income limits than SSI and fewer covered services under Medicaid than for categorically needy recipients, it may not offer enough of an incentive for the disabled to leave.
Perhaps the most useful extension of the current study would be to develop a model that includes a more broadened look at the effects of health on SSI participation, along the lines of Wolfe and Hill (1995) . This would be important for two reasons. First, by examining a data set with better measures of health status (such as the SIPP), I could directly test the hypothesis that SSI recipients became healthier. Second, by incorporating health directly into the SSI participation equation, it may be possible to see which type of disabled person responds to different government policies concerning extension of Medicaid benefits.
APPENDIX 
